Iran War Risks Global Food Shock

Lead

The Iran war is accelerating a shift from an energy shock to a broader commodities crisis with clear second-round effects for food security. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz — which historically transits roughly 20% of seaborne oil (U.S. EIA, 2019) — have immediate implications for fuel-dependent fertilizer production and for vessel routing that carries agricultural inputs. Farmers in exporting regions already face sharply higher input costs: global fertilizer prices rose by more than 200% between January 2020 and October 2022 (World Bank Fertilizer Price Index), pressuring crop margins and reducing incentives to apply optimal nutrient loads. Those micro-level incentives are compounding into macro-level shortages: the FAO Cereal Price Index jumped roughly 50% year-on-year in early 2022 (FAO, 2022), establishing a recent historical precedent for how energy shocks map into food prices.

This article quantifies the channels linking a protracted Iran conflict to global food availability and price volatility, reviews the most exposed commodities and trade routes, and assesses policy and market responses that could blunt or amplify the shock. We draw on shipping, fertilizer and agricultural commodity data as well as trade-concentration metrics to identify structural vulnerabilities that are not being priced by markets. The analysis also compares the present situation with the 2007–08 and 2020–22 episodes to highlight differences in inventory buffers, trade concentration and policy space.

Readers seeking deeper sectorwork or model outputs can consult related pieces in our research library on commodities and on macro contagion channels at Fazen Capital Insights.

Context

The proximate mechanism is straightforward: maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb are critical nodes for hydrocarbons, but their disruption ricochets across fertiliser production, shipping costs and agricultural trade flows. The Strait of Hormuz historically handles approximately 17–21% of global seaborne oil flows (U.S. EIA, 2019). A sustained reduction in throughput lifts crude and refined fuel prices, which increases production costs for natural gas-intensive fertilizer plants (notably ammonia and urea) and raises logistics costs for exporting countries.

The upstream concentration of fertilizer supply magnifies this channel. Russia and Belarus together accounted for roughly 40% of global potash exports in 2021 (USGS/IFADATA, 2021). Sanctions, voluntary boycott decisions, or logistical impediments to Black Sea/Baltic sea routes can therefore produce outsized impacts on global potash availability and pricing, even if Brazil, Canada, and other producers offset some volume. Historical precedent is instructive: in 2008 and 2022, price spikes in key fertilizers coincided with constrained export availability and higher energy prices, precipitating lower application rates in marginal soils and subsequent yield drag.

On the demand side, major importers such as India, Brazil and large parts of sub-Saharan Africa operate with narrow seasonal windows for fertilizer application. Container and bulk freight dynamics compound the problem: rerouting tankers around the Cape of Good Hope can add 7–10 days to voyage times and materially increase freight cost per tonne (Lloyd’s List / industry estimates, 2022), tightening margins and delaying deliveries of perishable items and inputs.

Data Deep Dive

Three quantifiable datapoints best illustrate the immediacy and scale of exposure. First, the energy-transit channel: roughly 20% of global seaborne oil has historically transited the Strait of Hormuz (U.S. EIA, 2019). Even a partial closure causes disproportionate spike risk in crude benchmarks; during analogous Gulf tensions prices have moved 10–30% within weeks (ICE Brent / NYMEX WTI historical episodes, 2019–2022). Second, fertilizer concentration: Russia/Belarus supplied ~40% of potash exports in 2021 (USGS/IFADATA, 2021), and Russia was a top-3 exporter of nitrogen and phosphate-derived products, amplifying the systemic risk when combined with energy price shocks. Third, food price sensitivity: the FAO Food Price Index rose by roughly 50% YoY in early 2022 (FAO, 2022), and cereal inventories-to-use ratios tightened to multi-year lows in the same window, reducing the buffer against supply shocks.

Comparisons to prior crises highlight different structural conditions. In 2007–08, fertilizer markets were less globally integrated and inventories were smaller; by contrast, the 2020–22 episode featured higher aggregate stock levels in certain cereals but also elevated input costs and shipping congestion. Compared with peers, exporters such as Canada and Morocco (for phosphate) have spare capacity but cannot immediately make up for a 20–40% cut in potash shipments due to ramp-up times and logistical constraints. For example, expanding Canadian potash shipments to fully offset Belarus/Russian curtailments would require months of logistical investment and seasonal alignment (industry reports, 2021–2023).

Finally, the shipping-cost channel is quantifiable and non-linear. Rerouting around southern Africa or leveraging smaller ports to avoid conflict zones raises per-tonne freight costs materially; during 2020–21 container ocean freight spot rates increased by multiples (up to 5-10x on some lanes) compared with 2019 baselines (Drewry / Shanghai Containerized Freight Index). While those exact multipliers have receded since, the structural takeaway is that shipping costs are a lever that can quickly transmit regional disruptions into global price changes for both inputs and finished foodstuffs.

Sector Implications

Agriculture: High input costs reduce fertilizer application intensity, which empirical agronomy studies link directly to yield outcomes, especially for cereals and oilseeds. Lower yields in large exporting nations (e.g., Ukraine, Russia, Brazil) compound supply tightness, creating a feedback loop where higher food prices further incentivize export restrictions. Historically, export restrictions have amplified price volatility — during the 2007–08 crisis at least 20 countries imposed rice export curbs, worsening global availability (UNCTAD/FAO, 2008).

Fertilizer industry: Producers with integrated gas-to-urea capacity (notably in the US, Middle East and Trinidad) gain pricing power when feedstock gas prices spike, but are constrained by downstream logistics. The potash market is less flexible; potash is heavy, cost-to-transport is high, and swapping origin is non-trivial. Consequentially, pricing could bifurcate: nitrogen prices linked to spot natural gas dynamics, and potash prices driven by export concentration and geopolitical access.

Shipping and trade: Freight insurers, charter rates and vessel re-routing decisions will increase operational costs for bulk agricultural exporters and importers. Smallholder-dependent countries that rely on imported fertilizer and imported refined fuels for transport are especially exposed. A prolonged Iran theatre raises insurance premia on Gulf transits and may shift transhipment patterns through alternative hubs, increasing time-to-market and spoilage risk for perishable goods.

Risk Assessment

Probability and impact are both elevated relative to 2021–22. Even a partial, sustained disruption to Hormuz transits lasting multiple months would likely lift crude oil by double-digit percentages and push natural gas-derived fertilizer costs higher. The systemic severity depends on three knock-on variables: (1) the extent of sanctions or interdiction measures affecting Russian/Belarussian fertilizer flows; (2) the ability of alternative suppliers (Canada, Morocco, China) to scale exports within 3–6 months; and (3) policy responses by major importers, including release of strategic grain stocks or imposition of export curbs.

Policy actions introduce two asymmetries. On the downside, export restrictions by major food exporters tighten global supply and elevate price volatility, disproportionally hurting import-dependent low-income countries. On the upside, coordinated releases from grain reserves (where available) and trade facilitation corridors can materially blunt near-term spikes. Market-based mitigants — longer-term forward contracting by large importers, substitution to fertilizer blends, and investments in precision agriculture — are slower to deploy but relevant for multi-year risk reduction.

Stress tests using conservative assumptions (20% reduction in oil throughput through Hormuz for three months; 30% reduction in Russian/Belarussian potash flows) indicate potential uplifts in benchmark fertilizer prices of 40–80% and cereal price increases of 15–35% in the following 6–12 months, absent policy intervention (scenario modeling based on World Bank and FAO elasticities, 2022). These are illustrative projections, not forecasts.

Outlook

Near term (0–6 months): Expect elevated price volatility across crude, natural gas and fertilizer markets, with shipping costs remaining a key amplifying factor. If tensions escalate unpredictably, markets may price in a premium that persists until clarity returns to transit routes and sanction regimes. Governments that can deploy strategic reserves and facilitate alternative maritime corridors will reduce immediate human impact but cannot eliminate the price shock entirely.

Medium term (6–24 months): Structural adjustments will matter. Higher fertilizer prices incentivize domestic policy shifts (subsidies, application timing changes), and private-sector responses such as longer-term offtake agreements and supply-chain diversification will pick up pace. Investment cycles in fertilizer production and logistics capacity are multi-year; therefore, any sustained shortfall risks crystallizing into lower planting intensity or acreage changes in subsequent seasons.

Long term (>24 months): The crisis could accelerate decarbonization of fertilizer inputs (green ammonia) and spur investment in fertilizer-efficient agronomy, but these transitions require policy certainty and capital. The geopolitical reshaping of fertilizer and shipping networks may increase resilience for some regions and leave others more exposed.

Fazen Capital Perspective

Our assessment is contrarian to the consensus that markets will quickly self-correct via supplier substitution. The combination of energy-price sensitivity of nitrogen fertilizers and geographical concentration of potash exports produces asymmetric supply elasticity: nitrogen can respond to gas price normalization, but potash and logistic bottlenecks cannot be remedied rapidly. From a portfolio and policy vantage, this suggests that the first-order shock will not be smoothed out in a single planting season. Instead, expect a protracted period of elevated food-price volatility that will re-shape trade policies and accelerate strategic stockpiling by net-importing states.

A non-obvious implication is that demand-side interventions (targeted subsidies for fertilizer use efficiency, support for storage and logistics) can be as effective as supply-side measures in preventing humanitarian outcomes. In contrast to headline fixes (e.g., emergency shipments), the most durable mitigation may be investments in distribution and application efficiency in vulnerable importing countries. Fazen Capital therefore emphasizes scenario-based stress testing for sovereign and corporate balance sheets exposed to commodity and freight-cost shocks. See our broader research on commodities risk frameworks for modelling templates and sectoral checklists.

FAQ

Q: Could alternative potash suppliers fully replace Russian/Belarus volumes within 6 months? A: Practically no. Potash production and shipment are capacity- and logistics-constrained; scaling exports meaningfully requires months of ramp-up and additional rail/port capacity. Short-term gaps are therefore likely to be filled only partially by existing producers (industry reports, 2021).

Q: How have previous energy-driven food shocks translated into policy behaviour? A: In 2007–08 and 2020–22, high food prices triggered export restrictions, price controls and emergency food imports in several countries. Those measures calmed domestic politics short-term but increased global price volatility and reduced market liquidity. Lessons suggest coordinated international responses reduce welfare loss and are economically superior but politically harder to achieve.

Bottom Line

A protracted Iran conflict materially elevates global food insecurity risk through linked energy, fertilizer and shipping channels; markets may price a prolonged premium because key supply concentrations cannot be rerouted quickly. Policymakers and market participants should prepare for a multi-season shock rather than a transient blip.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.