Turkey Sells 60 Tons of Gold After Iran War

Lead paragraph

Turkey’s central bank disclosed the sale and swap of 60 metric tonnes of gold in late March 2026, a move first reported by Investing.com on March 26, 2026 (Investing.com). The transaction — described by the central bank as a mix of sales and swaps — was executed following heightened regional tensions related to the conflict involving Iran, and represents a significant operational deployment of physical reserves in a short window. At standard conversion, 60 tonnes equals approximately 1,929,045 troy ounces (1 metric tonne = 32,150.7466 troy ounces), a volume large enough to shift near-term domestic liquidity dynamics and to affect local bullion market flows. Using an illustrative LBMA spot price of $2,200 per troy ounce on March 26, 2026 (assumption for valuation purposes), the notional value of the 60 tonnes is approximately $4.24 billion; the article notes the underlying objectives were to support domestic monetary and FX market functioning rather than to fund fiscal needs (Investing.com, Mar 26, 2026). This report lays out context, data-driven analysis, sector implications and risks — and concludes with the Fazen Capital perspective on what the transaction signals for reserve management and market structure.

Context

The Turkish central bank’s operation must be read against an elevated backdrop of geopolitical risk and constrained FX liquidity. Official reporting via the central bank and corroborating coverage (Investing.com, Mar 26, 2026) places the operation in late March, following regional escalation tied to military actions near Iran. Historically, central banks have turned to gold operations — sales, swaps or temporary leases — when policy transmission is stressed or when they need to manage short-term liquidity without fully depleting foreign currency liquid assets.

Turkey’s use of gold as an operational tool is consistent with a broader trend among emerging-market central banks that maintain meaningful gold allocations as a complement to FX reserves. The March 26, 2026 disclosure arrived alongside increased local-market volatility in the Turkish lira and spike in short-term domestic funding rates, according to market participants cited in contemporaneous press coverage (Investing.com). While the central bank did not publish a line-by-line breakdown of counterparties or exact timing within that week, the size — 60 tonnes — is large in any comparable central-bank operation and therefore noteworthy for both domestic and international bullion markets.

Operationally, swaps differ from outright sales because they imply a contingent repurchase or a reversed trade in the future; the central bank’s mix of sales and swaps therefore signals both immediate liquidity extraction and planned flexibility to restore positions. That duality is important: swaps can sterilize temporary liquidity demands without permanently reducing long-term gold holdings if structured as repurchase agreements. The balance between permanent sales and temporary swaps will determine whether Turkey’s sovereign gold stock declines materially or whether the move is a short-term liquidity measure.

Data Deep Dive

The immediate quantifiable facts: 60 metric tonnes were sold or swapped, the disclosure was reported on March 26, 2026, and the conversion of mass to troy ounces yields roughly 1,929,045 oz. These arithmetic facts are robust because the metric-to-troy conversion is standardized (1 tonne = 32,150.7466 troy oz). Using these quantities enables credible valuation scenarios: at $2,200/oz the 60 tonnes equate to roughly $4.24 billion; at $1,900/oz they equate to ~ $3.66 billion. Those valuation bands illustrate how sensitive notional reserve value is to spot price movements and why central banks are cautious about selling into thin markets.

Beyond valuation, the operation’s market impact depends on execution method and counterparties. If the central bank sold into local refineries, domestic bullion dealers or state-linked industrial users, the near-term effect would be an increase in domestic lira liquidity and a likely downward pressure on domestic gold premiums. If a substantial portion was swapped with foreign counterparties, the immediate balance-sheet hit is mitigated but interest/carry costs and duration mismatches may arise. Investing.com’s reporting did not disclose counterparties or exact maturity profiles; absent that data we model two scenarios: (1) 100% outright sale — immediate reserve depletion; (2) 70% swaps/30% sales — partial temporary liquidity provision with limited permanent reserve loss.

Comparatively, the volume is large relative to routine market flows. Central-bank gold sales in the 2010s were typically in small, disclosed chunks; a single 60-tonne operation would rank as among the larger one-off flows in recent years for any single central bank. For context, central-bank market interventions often occur in tens of tonnes rather than hundreds, and the timing (a concentrated month-long move) increases the potential for acute price effects in the local market even if global price impact is tempered by overall LBMA liquidity.

Sector Implications

For the bullion market, the headline led to an immediate re-pricing of risk premia in domestic Turkish gold markets and an uptick in reported dealer inventories as market participants balanced deliveries and swap positions. Global bullion benchmarks — which price through deep London and New York liquidity — absorbed the flow with limited immediate dislocation, but regional spreads and forward curves likely widened. Dealers in Istanbul and the wider Anatolian jewellery supply chain face working-capital implications if a meaningful share of the metal was sold locally.

For Turkey’s macro policy transmission, the move highlights operational constraints. Selling or swapping central-bank gold injects domestic liquidity and can be an instrument to support the lira or stabilize short-term funding markets without using FX reserves; however, it can also reduce the central bank’s strategic buffer against external shocks if the sales are permanent. The policymaker trade-off here is clear: immediate domestic market stabilization versus maintaining long-run reserve optionality. The lack of a full breakdown of swaps versus sales makes assessing that trade-off analytically necessary but empirically uncertain.

For investors and counterparties, the operation suggests central banks in geopolitically exposed jurisdictions may expand use of non-USD reserve instruments in crisis windows. This has knock-on implications for cross-border gold custody, settlement flows, and the role of domestic bullion markets as quasi-central-bank backstops. Institutional counterparties will watch subsequent weekly reserve disclosures and central-bank comments to determine whether the 60 tonnes will be replaced via later purchases or financed out of existing reserve buffers.

Risk Assessment

Key near-term risks include execution risk, signalling risk and reserve-adequacy risk. Execution risk arises if sales occurred into thin local liquidity, potentially amplifying price moves and creating domestic market dislocations. Signalling risk presents if market participants interpret the operation as an admission of pressure on FX reserves or as the start of an ongoing disinvestment cycle in official-sector precious metals holdings. Reserve-adequacy risk concerns the central bank’s ability to meet contingent liabilities; permanent depletion of gold reserves reduces one avenue for external liquidity management.

A second-order risk is reputational and operational: counterparties that absorbed swaps may find themselves exposed to return-deliveries in stressed markets, increasing counterparty credit risk. Finally, if swaps were used extensively and priced at adverse rates, the central bank could face higher effective funding costs compared with traditional FX borrowing — relevant for fiscal and monetary coordination in Turkey.

Monitoring indicators over the next 3-6 months should include weekly reserve reports from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), domestic gold premiums, lira volatility measures (e.g., 1M/3M implied), and changes in the LBMA forward curve. These metrics will help distinguish between temporary liquidity operations and a structural shift in reserve composition.

Fazen Capital Perspective

From Fazen Capital’s vantage, the 60-tonne operation is best viewed as tactical reserve management rather than a strategic reallocation away from gold. The mix of swaps and sales signals a desire to retain optionality; swaps preserve the ability to reverse flows and are a calibrated response to acute funding pressures. That said, a near-term buyer’s market for Turkish-sourced gold could attract specialized counterparties that opportunistically acquire metal at local premiums — a classical arbitrage between regional market stress and global liquidity. Institutional investors should interpret this transaction as evidence that central-bank reserve management in geopolitically exposed EMs can be active and nonlinear, and plan scenarios where official-sector metal moves become an intermittent source of supply.

Contrarian view: if markets over-interpret the move as structural divestment, this may create an attractive entry point for tactical accumulation of bullion or bullion-linked exposures — provided investors differentiate between temporary operational sales and long-term portfolio reallocations. Fazen Capital expects follow-up communications from the CBRT and asequential restoration of reserve positions if the geopolitical shock stabilizes; absent that, the longer-term implications for reserve composition deserve close scrutiny.

Fazen Capital encourages readers to consult contemporaneous weekly CBRT releases and market data feeds, including topic coverage on reserve management, for evolving analysis.

Bottom Line

The CBRT’s sale and swap of 60 tonnes of gold reported on March 26, 2026, is a sizable, tactical operation that provided immediate domestic liquidity while preserving potential optionality through swaps; its ultimate macro impact depends on whether the transactions are temporary or permanent. Market participants should watch CBRT weekly reserve data and domestic bullion-market spreads for signs of enduring reserve change.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.

FAQ

Q: How large is 60 tonnes compared with typical central-bank gold transactions?

A: A 60-tonne operation is sizable for a single central bank in a compressed time frame. By conversion, it equals ~1.93 million troy ounces (1 tonne = 32,150.7466 oz), which in many years would rank among the larger single-country operational flows. That size is large enough to move regional premiums even if global LBMA liquidity mitigates price shocks.

Q: Does a swap imply the central bank still owns the gold?

A: Not always; swaps generally imply a temporary transfer of title with a contractual obligation to reverse the transaction at a later date. The accounting and balance-sheet treatment depend on contract terms: some swaps are economically akin to secured borrowing, others are structured as outright transfers contingent on a repurchase. The operational significance is that swaps can provide temporary liquidity without permanent reserve depletion if reversed.

Q: What should investors watch next?

A: Monitor CBRT weekly reserve statements, domestic Turkish gold premiums and lira implied-volatility indices over the next 4-12 weeks. Also watch deliveries and inventories at local refineries and reported swap maturities to determine whether the 60 tonnes represent a one-off tactical intervention or the start of a more durable shift in official-sector reserve composition. For ongoing analysis see topic.