Iran-US Messages Passed via Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan
March 23, 20267 min readStandard
Fazen Markets Research
AI-Enhanced Analysis
Iran-USmediationTurkeyEgyptPakistan
The past 48 hours have produced the most concrete public reporting of third-party messaging between Iran and the United States since the spike in regional tensions earlier this year. Axios reporter Barak Ravid reported on Mar 23, 2026 that Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan each passed messages between senior U.S. officials and Tehran in an effort described by a U.S. source as "making progress." The actors reportedly held separate talks with White House envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi; the U.S. source said discussions covered "ending the war and resolving all outstanding issues" with the expectation of rapid answers. The development — three states operating in parallel over a two-day window (Mar 21-23, 2026) — represents a departure from the more siloed mediation patterns of prior cycles and has immediate implications for regional risk premia and policy calibration in Washington and allied capitals.
The reporting by Axios (Mar 23, 2026) builds on a pattern in which regional powers have intermittently acted as intermediaries between Tehran and Western capitals, but the multi-track nature of these contacts is noteworthy. Historically, Oman and Switzerland have been the more visible backchannels; the current episode involves Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan simultaneously engaging with both sides, which increases redundancy but also complicates coordination. The U.S. source quoted by Ravid emphasized that the mediation is "ongoing and making progress," language that signals movement but not a near-term breakthrough. Given the public posture from Tehran that any de-escalation would require reciprocal U.S. steps — a stance referenced in reporting and prior statements by Iranian officials — the sequencing of concessions and operational pauses will be central.
The involvement of three distinct intermediaries also reflects differing incentive structures. Turkey has strategic proximity to Iran and long-standing economic ties; Egypt has leverage through diplomatic networks in the Arab world and security relationships with the U.S.; Pakistan offers a unique channel to Tehran via its long border and historical ties. Each brings different credibility and risk profiles to mediation: Turkey's engagement may be viewed by Tehran as transactional, Egypt's as regionally normative, and Pakistan's as securitized and discreet. For market observers and policymakers, these differences matter because they affect the likelihood of verifiable measures — such as pauses in kinetic activity — versus more ephemeral confidence-building steps.
Finally, the timing — reported contacts over Mar 21-23, 2026 — arrives after a recent period of heightened kinetic incidents that elevated perceived tail risks in oil, regional shipping, and defence spending. While reporting does not indicate that concrete agreements were signed, the public confirmation of back-and-forth messaging serves to reduce informational asymmetry and can be expected to lower short-term volatility relative to an environment where no channels are acknowledged.
Axios identified three specific intermediaries: Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, each engaging in separate talks with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Axios, Mar 23, 2026). That reporting provides at least four discrete data points: (1) the number of intermediaries (3), (2) the named principals (Witkoff and Araghchi), (3) the reported time window (two days, Mar 21-23, 2026), and (4) the U.S. source's language indicating progress. These points allow measurement of the episode's scale relative to prior backchannels. For instance, by contrast, the Oman-mediated contacts that informed the 2015 JCPOA negotiations were typically single-track and protracted; here, three-track engagement compresses diplomatic bandwidth and raises coordination challenges.
Quantifying market impact requires translating geopolitical statements into observable metrics. Following the initial reports, regional risk indicators historically respond in a calibrated way: in previous flare-ups a publicly confirmed opening of talks reduced near-term oil volatility by up to 30% from peak intraday moves, while risk-on returns in regional equities improved between 1-3% over a two-day window. Those magnitudes are illustrative rather than prescriptive for this episode, but they reflect the mechanism through which mediation announcements can shave risk premia. The immediate dataset to watch includes Brent crude price moves versus volatility (OVX), regional CDS spreads for major Gulf sovereigns, and hard-currency bond yields for issuers with exposure to the Gulf and Red Sea routes.
From a diplomatic-data perspective, the structural facts matter: three intermediaries signal both breadth of engagement and potential for message dilution. If each intermediary transmits similar messages, redundancy increases resilience against mistranslation; if messages diverge, the risk of mixed signals rises. Monitoring subsequent public statements, bilateral meeting logs, and any concrete proposals (e.g., conditional pause lists, prisoner exchanges, or phased deconfliction zones) will provide quantifiable evidence about the depth of progress. For investors and policy analysts, key dates will include any follow-up contacts cited by official channels and the timeline for replies referenced by the U.S. source — the source said "we hope to have answers soon," implying an expected near-term response window that can be tracked against statements and market reactions.
Geopolitical mediation between Iran and the U.S. has heterogeneous effects across sectors. Energy markets react most directly: a credible reduction in tail risk typically compresses the oil risk premium embedded in futures prices and can lead to a normalization of backwardation structures seen during acute crises. Shipping and insurance sectors also benefit; a decline in perceived threats to transit routes — even if provisional — tends to lower war-risk premiums for vessels operating in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, which in turn reduces spot freight costs for key choke-point routes. Conversely, defense contractors and regional military procurement pathways face potential near-term uncertainty if a de-escalation trajectory removes the immediacy fueling accelerated orders.
Financial markets price in differential exposure. In past episodes, Gulf sovereign CDS tightened by several basis points on confirmation of talks, while regional equities rallied modestly; sovereigns with larger hydrocarbon export shares saw more pronounced moves. Comparatively, the contemporaneous engagement of Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan should produce uneven sectoral effects because Iran's responses vary by interlocutor and topic. For multinational companies with supply chains that traverse the region, the primary operational variable will be the duration and verifiability of any pause in kinetic action, not merely the existence of messaging.
For policymakers, the multi-track approach affects leverage. The U.S. administration can use multiple third-party conduits to test messages and preserve deniability, but that strategy complicates any later effort to hold Tehran accountable to a single, auditable set of commitments. That complexity has implications for sanctions administration, customs controls, and export licensing; regulators will need clear windows to translate diplomatic statements into policy changes — a process that historically lags public reports by days to weeks.
The key operational risk is sequencing. Iranian officials have signaled that meaningful de-escalation requires concrete U.S. steps; the U.S. view, as reflected in the language quoted by Axios, frames de-escalation as needing answers from Tehran as well. If either side misreads the other's public posture or tries to secure unilateral concessions, the mediation could fail and volatility could reassert. The presence of three intermediaries mitigates single-point failure but raises coordination risk: divergent expectations from Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan could produce overlapping but non-identical understandings.
Another risk is signaling versus substance. Public acknowledgement of messaging reduces immediate informational uncertainty, but if the talks produce no verifiable deliverables, markets and policymakers will quickly recalibrate and may punish optimism. Historical precedents demonstrate that short-lived, unverified diplomatic noise can amplify cyclical volatility when actors on the ground continue kinetic operations. Observables to monitor include any lists of proposed confidence-building measures, timelines attached to replies, and third-party verification channels.
Finally, domestic politics in the mediating states represent a latent risk. Each intermediary must manage both external expectations and internal constituencies; a change in domestic calculus in Turkey, Egypt or Pakistan — for example, shifts in electoral outlooks, security incidents, or economic pressures — could alter their willingness to press Tehran or Washington. That dependency on domestic windows constrains the durability of the mediation unless codified into clear, reciprocal steps.
Fazen Capital views the emergence of three concurrent intermediaries as a signal that both Tehran and Washington prefer a low-visibility path to risk reduction, but with a deliberate hedging approach. Our contrarian read is that multiple intermediaries reduce the probability of rapid, enforceable agreements precisely because they create alternative narratives: Tehran can point to different interlocutors to shape expectations domestically, while the U.S. can evaluate proposals in parallel without committing publicly. This means that while headline risk — the probability of immediate, large-scale escalatory shock — has likely diminished, the structural uncertainty about long-term conflict resolution has not.
From an asset-allocation lens (observational, not advisory), the practical implication is that market reflexivity will be high: positive headlines will compress premiums quickly, but absent transparent verification the market will walk back those gains as soon as countervailing signals emerge. We therefore expect episodes of short-lived risk-on behaviour interspersed with renewed caution until a track-record of verifiable steps accumulates. This creates trading and policy windows that hinge on discrete announcements rather than gradual trend shifts.
Fazen Capital recommends that institutional risk managers and policy analysts prioritize leading indicators — detailed timelines, verification mechanisms, and intermediary coordination statements — over headline confirmations. For those seeking periodic updates, our geopolitical research hub publishes regular briefs and scenario workstreams: see topic and our deeper scenario analyses at topic.
Q: What is the historical precedent for multiple intermediaries in U.S.-Iran communications?
A: Multiple intermediaries have been used before but typically in staggered rather than simultaneous fashion. Oman served as a principal backchannel during pre-2015 JCPOA talks; by contrast, the Mar 21-23, 2026 reporting identifies three states operating in parallel. The parallel approach increases redundancy but also complicates unified verification, a lesson borne out in past negotiations where single-track mediation allowed clearer audit trails.
Q: How soon could markets react materially to any confirmed agreement?
A: Market reaction tends to be immediate to verified actions rather than to exploratory messaging. In prior episodes, confirmed, verifiable measures (for example, publicly observable deconfliction or calibrated pauses) produced measurable moves within 24-48 hours: oil volatility compressed and regional equities tended to rally. However, the durability of such moves depended on subsequent verification and follow-through — flash rallies were common when actions proved temporary.
Q: Could other states join the mediation effort and what would that imply?
A: Additional states could join if they possess credible channels to Tehran and Washington; European states, Gulf partners, or neutral parties like Switzerland could add legitimacy. Expansion of the mediator set would likely increase coordination burden but could also provide avenues for sequencing verifiable steps, which would be constructive for long-term de-escalation.
Axios reporting on Mar 23, 2026 that Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan relayed messages between Iran and the U.S. over Mar 21-23 indicates a multi-track, low-visibility effort to reduce tail risks; immediate reduction in headline risk is likely, but durable resolution hinges on verifiable, sequenced steps. Monitor timelines, verification mechanisms and intermediary coordination for signals of substantive progress.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
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